Here are several simple illustrations of several cosmological arguments that can be used in day-to-day evangelism.
The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument:
We have a dilemma: The universe is either dependent or it is not dependent. If it is dependent, then its existence is explained by something else (That’s the definition of being dependent). Now, the entity in which the existence of the universe is grounded cannot itself be a dependent being, otherwise we create an infinite regression. If there is a never ending chain of explanations, then nothing ends up getting explained! It’s like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit — there is no foundation. This entity must thus be an independent entity, otherwise known as God.
On the other hand, if the universe is not a dependent entity, then that implies that the universe must exist in every possible state of affairs, since it is not dependent on anything. But surely the universe could have not existed, so there must be a reason why there exists something rather than nothing.
The Thomistic Cosmological Argument 1 (This comes from J. P. Moreland):
“Suppose that I went to you and said, “Could I borrow a typewriter?” And you said, “Absolutely. I don’t own one, but let me borrow one, and I’ll give it to you.” So you go to someone and say, “I’d like to loan a typewriter to my friend. Could I borrow one from you?” And the person says, “Absolutely. Unfortunately, I don’t own a typewriter. Let me go get one.”
“Well, if you keep doing that, then no one is going to get a typewriter, because everyone is a borrowing lender that has to get a typewriter first. Eventually, you’re going to have to stop with somebody who just has a typewriter who doesn’t have to borrow it first.”
“Now, the same thing is true for existing. If I have to be given existence by something before I can give existence to my children, whatever gave existence to me – if it had to get existence from something else, you eventually have to stop with something that just has a typewriter – that just exists and doesn’t come from anywhere.”
The Thomistic Cosmological Argument 2 (This comes from David Beck):
“Imagine you are seeing for the first time, a train moving past you. Baffled, you wonder how the boxcar is moving. You come to realize that it is being pulled by another boxcar in front of it, and so on, down the tracks beyond your view.”
“This picture allows us to visualize the various naturalistic scenarios so commonly heard in our society that attempts to describe how it is that things come to be in our world. “The cosmos is a great circle of life,” we are told. But, stringing boxcars all the way around the world in a circle until the last one hooks up to the first will still not explain the motion of even the first boxcar. And just so, if contingent things cause each other to exist in a closed circle, there is nothing to initiate the causality, nothing ever starts.”
“..The only explanation for the moving line of boxcars is that somewhere there is a locomotive powerful enough to pull the whole train while it itself does not need to be pulled. So the idea of a first cause is fuller than it might at first appear. It is the initiating cause of existence of everything in the system of causes, and it exists without any cause or dependency whatsoever. It is strictly uncaused. Note that it is not self-caused, as if it had deficiencies or needs that it is capable of supplying by itself. It is strictly uncaused, unlimited, infinite.”
The Kalam Cosmological Argument:
The universe either began to exist or it didn’t begin to exist. If it began to exist, then its beginning was either caused or uncaused. If the universe was caused, then the cause is either personal or impersonal.
Picture the universe like a balloon. Science tells us that the universe is constantly expanding, similar to how a balloon expands when it’s inflated with air. If we take an expanding balloon and go backwards, we see that it becomes smaller and smaller. The same is true of the universe. If the universe is currently expanding, then there must have been a point in the past where it was incredibly small. Now just as balloons don’t inflate themselves, there had to be a cause for the beginning of the universe. This cause couldn’t have been determined by nature, since we’re trying to explain how nature itself began. Thus, the cause must have been a free agent who had the willpower to create. We call such a being God.
Tags: analogy, cosmological argument
The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument suffers from equivocating “universe” as cosmologists use it, and the non-rigorous definition of “all that exists”. Also, infinite regress is only a problem when trying to justify something. For something that did not begin to exist, it’s not a problem.
For thomistic arguments, the problem is self defeating. It’s a special pleading for a figure which leads to the problem of causality. Either time and universe began, or it didn’t. Since time and universe are said to have begun together, it leads to a problem. If it ever began to exist, this means there’s a prior moment in which it didn’t exist. But how can there be a moment when time didn’t exist? Same goes for kalam. Either it began to exist, which means time itself is eternal, in which case the claim that the universe HAD to have begun to exist is refuted, or it didn’t begin to exist, since there was no moment prior to which it did not exist, which STILL leads to the same conclusion.
Also, love the intellectual dishonesty you’re putting forth here, since the claim that the universe actually had begun has been shown to be at least not been established, but you go on pretending like it has, even when your claim has been refuted SEVERAL times. Joe
Oh, I forgot to add, in the Thomistic argument, OF COURSE you’re going to have problems when you’re trying to force a beginning and an end to infinity. You can have finite sets within an infinity, and you can divide a finite set of numbers to have infinite divisions, but you can’t force infinity to begin and end, which is what Moreland is trying to do. He then goes to claim, victory for proving the obvious. Joe
Where exactly does it equivocate, and how? The LCA offers a very minimal definition of the universe as comprising the set of all contingent entities. It’s compatible with any and all cosmological theories, from a multiverse to M-theory.
What is this even supposed to mean?
Not so. Both the Leibnizian and Thomistic versions of the CA are such that they work even if the universe is eternal (Aquinas, in fact, presupposed the eternality of the universe). This is because they rely on different causal principles. In the LCA, for instance, even though the universe may be eternal, it is still contingent and thus requires an explanation.
In light of this, your charge that the TCA is “self-defeating” is incorrect, since you have not properly understood the argument.
That is not implied at all. If time began to exist, then there wouldn’t be a “prior” moment, since there would be no time. But this doesn’t mean that time did not begin to exist, it only means that it is nonsensical to speak of a “time before time.”
You have completely misunderstood Moreland’s argument. He is not attempting to “force a beginning and an end to infinity,” but rather he is trying to show that an infinitely regressing causal chain cannot account for the existence of contingent beings. Tim H
Uh, when it claims the universe “begins” to exist, because it is considered “contingent”. The current universe which inflated from the big bang is “finite” in the sense that “prior” to the big bang, it did not exist in the inflated state or in the observable condition it is today.
infinite regress is only a problem in epistemology.
Except contingency is really referring to the FORM of whatever the universe takes. For example, the current observable universe is contingent upon the big bang for it to have expanded. What is “necessary” is the material constitutes.
really now? Let’s see what you have to say about that.
Which means it never “did not exist”.
Trying to have your cake and eat it too? For something to begin existing, there MUST be a prior moment in which it did NOT exist. Otherwise, how can you say it began to exist?
No, I haven’t.
Except he is, by arbitrarily placing a “beginning” with the typrewriter, and an “end” with the other receiving the typewriter. Joe
Could I have an example of something that is not contingent (i.e., necessary)? Otherwise it seems that the Liebnizian argument could be rejected simply because ‘necessary’ would just be a synonym for ‘God’.
You may mention truths like 2+2=4. It seems wrong to me to call this [i]necessary[/i], as it appears to be dependent upon quantities. It would be difficult to prove that without the Universe quantities would still exist necessarily. But I’ll let you try to make that case before I can really figure out how it’s wrong! streetwaves
Streetwaves – mathematical entities are logically necessary and true in any possible world.
Take for example a possible world that has no quantities – it would then be true that that possible world has zero quantities. But then the number zero exists in that world and it is not true that that world has no quantities.
In any case I believe (Tim can correct me if I’m wrong) that the Thomistic argument tries to establish the metaphysical necessity of God and the Leibnizian argument tries to establish logical necessity of God. There is a subtle difference between the two. chris
“Except contingency is really referring to the FORM of whatever the universe takes. For example, the current observable universe is contingent upon the big bang for it to have expanded. What is “necessary” is the material constitutes. ” — Joe
…no. By “contingency” in this context it’s meant that it’s possible for the universe to not exist.
Necessary means not possible to not exist. chris
Did you even read my post? Nowhere did I say that according to the LCA, the universe began to exist because it is contingent. The universe doesn’t have to begin for the LCA to be effective, since it is not concerned with how it came into being, but with an explanation for its existence. The universe can be eternal, yet it would still require an explanation for why it exists.
Can you back this assertion up? It is most definitely a problem in causation and explanation as well. If the chain of explanations infinitely regresses, then nothing ends up being explained since there is no foundation to base it on.
No, when we say that the universe is contingent, we are not saying that merely the structure of the matter is contingent but that matter itself is also contingent (For something to be contingent, by the way, is for its nonexistence to be possible). And just what about the nature of matter makes it necessarily existent? We can conceive of a possible world in which matter does not exist, thus it is contingent.
This does not follow. All that would imply is that, if time had a beginning, then there would be no prior moment, it doesn’t say that time itself is eternal.
In order for something to begin to exist, why must there be a prior moment in which it did not exist? This is just a mere assertion. To say that something begins to exist is simply to say that there is a first moment at which it exists. There doesn’t need to be a prior moment. Bill Craig offers the following analysis:
“e comes into being at t if and only if (1) e exists at t, (2) t is the first time at which e exists, and (3) e‘s existing at t is a tensed fact.”
[Craig and Copan, Creation Out of Nothing (Baker: 2004) p.158]
No, he isn’t. He’s presupposing that there exists an actually infinite chain of borrowing lenders in order to show the absurdity of traversing an actual infinite.
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In all seriousness, Joe, I think you should re-read my post. You’re treating all cosmological arguments as if they are the kalam.
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Streetwaves,
God, while he is a member of the set of necessary entities, does not exhaust that set. Philosophers usually consider other entities such as possible worlds, numbers, propositions, universals, etc… to exist necessarily as well.
And as Chris said, numbers must exist necessarily on every possible world. If no numbers existed on a possible world, then there would be zero numbers on that world. Now since the number zero would be instantiated, there would be one number. The number one would be then instantiated…. and so on, so forth.
Chris,
Good observations, I would just add that the TCA (At least, according to Aquinas) establishes the factual necessity of God. That is, while God actually exists, he could have not existed. Tim H
… and this doesn’t apply to god. Wow. Special pleading much?
That’s like saying you can’t travel a finite distance in an infinite space.
Except contingency is really referring to the FORM of whatever the universe takes. For example, the current observable universe is contingent upon the big bang for it to have expanded. What is “necessary” is the material constitutes.
Care to back this assertion? It’s “contingent” because its nonexistence is possible? Why not god? Because you defined it so? Gimme a break.
And just what about the nature of god that makes it necessary existent, and what evidence do you have to back such claim?
You can conceive of a world in which god does not exist, thus it is contingent. Applying your sort of special pleading in here is just laughable, Tim.
Uh, yes it does. Otherwise it never began to exist.
Because otherwise it never BEGAN to exist! How can you have something beginning to exist when it never did not exist?
Or a logical conclusion.
To say that something begins to exist is simply to say that there is a first moment at which it exists.
How do you have a first when it never did not exist? That’s just completely, inanely, nonsensical.
There doesn’t need to be a prior moment. Bill Craig offers the following analysis:
“e comes into being at t if and only if (1) e exists at t, (2) t is the first time at which e exists, and (3) e’s existing at t is a tensed fact.”
EXACTLY. (2) is the VERY problem HE and YOU highlight, which somehow you don’t see. If it’s the very first time which it exists, that means it MUST NEVER have existed BEFORE it. If it did, then it CANNOT be the first moment.
Except he is, by arbitrarily placing a “beginning” with the typrewriter, and an “end” with the other receiving the typewriter.
It’s absurd to say you can move from one end of infinity to the other, which is what he’s doing. This is trivially true, however, that’s not the problem here. It’s entirely possible for something to simply exist without beginning, and without end. Perhaps not in that particular structure, but that’s not important.
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In all seriousness, Tim, you really should check these “arguments” out and see the problem with them. Joe
Joe,
You seem to misunderstand the LCA in just about every conceivable way. The theist can grant the possibility of God’s non-existence prior to not having evidence for His necessity. However, the purpose of the LCA is to show FROM the contingency of the universe that God MUST exist.
Read above. Tim never said that… Gil S
Or you’re just trying REALLY hard to miss the glaring problem with this. Your proposed “solution” to the universe’s “contingency” is simply ANOTHER entity which, due to ITS contingency (we can conceive of god being nonexistent), it just utterly fails. It’s just another step in what HE calls the “infinite regress” problem. In fact, BECAUSE of this, principle of parsimony weeds out god, since it’s a superfluous entity. Joe
“And as Chris said, numbers must exist necessarily on every possible world. If no numbers existed on a possible world, then there would be zero numbers on that world. Now since the number zero would be instantiated, there would be one number. The number one would be then instantiated…. and so on, so forth.”
I haven’t given this enough though, so let’s hope I don’t look stupid. What do we mean by ‘numbers’? It seems to me that numbers depend on rational minds. For instance, if there is a pen containing cats and dogs, it is only because we are rational and thus able to distinguish between the two that we can say there are three cats and three dogs. If there existed no rational minds, the cats and dogs would still exist, but the quantities become meaningless.
If we conclude that numbers depend upon rational minds, we have to ask ourselves how numbers could be such that they exist on all possible worlds? It would seem that they would have to be dependent upon the existence of god. If this is so, they are not necessary but rather contingent upon the deity’s existence, and therefore the set of so-called ‘necessary entities’ only contains god and nothing else. streetwaves
To the contrary, you simply have a poor understanding of the LCA. Now to be fair, that’s to be expected since the formulation here is reduced to its simplest form. Tim, for example, does not explain why this independent entity needs to be God. That objection is not a problem for us. You can only posit God’s contingency (or possible non-existence) PRIOR to the inference that the universe is contingent. If the LCA shows that the universe is contingent then there must be something that’s necessary to eliminate an infinite regress. That explanation is said to be God. Though you are free to argue for an alternative explanation
Gil S
Really now?
But it is.
Why? It can be, and is done after because it utterly fails as conclusion, and you actually highlight why.
If the LCA shows that the universe is contingent then there must be something that’s necessary to eliminate an infinite regress.
By that reasoning, the universe is “necessary” to eliminate an infinite regress. This sort of special pleading employed in the LCA shows why it fails.
That explanation is nothing but a bare assertion, seeing as all you’re doing is posit some arbitrary “stop” to it, despite the fact that positing such entity is question begging of “where did god come from”, seeing as it’s “conceivable for god to not exist”, and thus is on a similar level, contingent.
I don’t need to. I just need to reject the argument here because it’s flawed. Joe
YOu know i recently read a fantastic article on the TCA from on urbanphilosophy.net and it was really informative. it was written by the best apologist I’ve ever read too. You-guessed-it
In all seriousness Joe, please show a little more respect. You may not agree with us, but there is no need to be condescending and overconfident.
No, it doesn’t. The LCA and TCA make distinctions between the two modes of being: existing contingently and existing necessarily. The universe, because it could have failed to exist, exists contingently. God, because by definition he is not dependent on anything for his existence, exists necessarily.
No, it’s saying that you cannot traverse an actual infinite as a whole. Again, it’s like trying to climb out of a bottomless pit — there is no foundation to begin with.
Yes, it is contingent because its non-existence is possible. We can imagine a state of affairs in which the universe does not exist, therefore it is contingent. God is not contingent because by definition God is not dependent on anything for his existence (That’s what we mean by God). It’s no more arbitrary than saying that triangles have three angles — that’s simply what we mean when we speak of them.
1) You did not answer my question
2) God is necessarily existent because he is not dependent on any other being for his existence. Since God is the greatest possible being, there cannot be any being greater than him. Therefore, he is not contingent. The very definition of God precludes him from being dependent on anything just as the very definition of circles precludes them from having any angles.
Correct, but we need to distinguish here between epistemic and metaphysical necessity. Strictly speaking, it is possible to conceive that God does not exist, but metaphysically speaking, this is impossible. For example, think of a complex math problem, one whose answer is not immediately obvious. Now it’s possible to conceive of a wrong answer to that problem yet that answer to be logically impossible because it is incorrect. Craig writes,
“Perhaps you’re tempted to say that both are true: it’s possible that such a being exists and it’s possible that He doesn’t. But here it’s crucial that we keep clear on the difference between metaphysical and merely epistemic possibility. The assertion “It’s possible that God exists, and it’s possible that He doesn’t exist!” is true only in the sense of epistemic possibility: “for all we know,” God may exist or He may not exist. On the other hand, if God is conceived as a maximally great being (that is, a being which is maximally excellent in every possible world), then His existence is either necessary or impossible, regardless of our epistemic uncertainty.”
“To illustrate: imagine seeing some extraordinarily difficult mathematical equation written on the blackboard. If it’s beyond our ability to grasp, we may say that it’s possible that the equation is true and it’s possible that it is false. But we thereby merely confess our epistemic uncertainty concerning the equation’s truth value. As a piece of mathematics, the equation itself is either necessarily true or necessarily false. We just don’t know which. But if it is true, it’s necessarily true, and therefore it’s not possible for it to be false. And if it is false, then it’s necessarily false, and therefore it’s not possible for it to be true.”
“In the same way, the epistemic entertainability of (1) or (1′) doesn’t imply that both are metaphysically possible. Only one of the two can be true, and it’s up to us to decide which one we think it is. The atheist has to maintain that the concept of a maximally great being is incoherent, like the concept of a married bachelor. The concept of a married bachelor is not a strictly self-contradictory concept (as is the concept of a married unmarried man), and yet it’s obvious, once one understands the meaning of the words “married” and “bachelor,” that nothing corresponding to that concept can exist. By contrast, the concept of a maximally great being does not seem even remotely incoherent. On the contrary, the concept of a maximally great being seems to be intuitively a coherent notion and, hence, possibly instantiated.”
No. To say that something begins to exist is to simply that that there is a first moment of its existing. The preceding definition shows that talk of the beginning of existence does not have to include a prior temporal moment. So when we say that time began to exist, all we mean is that there was a first moment in which time existed. This does not presuppose prior moments, just a first moment.
That’s not hard to see at all.
There is NO such thing as “before.” The very idea of a first moment rules that out. There is no such thing as moment “before” the first moment — that’s a logical contradiction.
Exactly, he is showing that absurdities result when you try to navigate an actual infinite. If everyone was a borrowing lender, then nobody would end up with a typewriter. Therefore, an infinite causal regression is impossible.
In all seriousness, you have a very naive understanding of the arguments. The fact that you confused the LCA and TCA with the KCA shows that you are unfamiliar with these arguments, so do us a favor and stop being overconfident — it makes you look silly. Tim H
Well, I’m only saying that it can’t be if the universe is contingent and only if there is no alternative explanation except God. This is the reason I said that God’s non-existence is conceivable only prior to the inference that the universe is contingent but it is not IF all the premises are true. That’s what the LCA wants to demonstrate. Now obviously, one could raise all sorts of objections to each of the premises but we still wouldn’t be special pleading here because this argument wants to show WHY it is impossible for God to not exist on the basis that He is the ONLY explanation for the universe, or so we say.
No. If you follow my reasoning, the universe could not be necessary “if the universe is contingent” because that would be a contradiction. Of course you can challenge the premise that contends the universe is contingent, which is where the real discussion is.
It’s not a bare assertion if God is the only valid explanation and IF all the premises of the LCA are true. A good critic plays the devil’s advocate to raise a counter response. You don’t do this and instead seem to be more concerned with what premises you find objectionable to YOUR philosophy. Because of this, you don’t attempt to “assume for the sake of argument” that the LCA is true to see what conclusion it establishes (or wants to establish). Gil S
I totally called it. You simply define god into existing. The universe does not depend on anything for it to exist, since contingency refers to the structure, as you call it. The sleight of hand you employ here is amazing- assuming your conclusion, and using it to a circular logic. You define god as “independent of anything”, while you define universe as “dependent” because you can conceive of it as “not existing”, while you simply CLAIM it cannot be said of god. What kind of special pleading is this?
This is trivially true, but that’s again assuming there is a beginning and end to infinity. However, you can go from one finite point and go on to infinity, never stopping, which is traversing infinity.
Perhaps this universe, in the form it had taken. However, the universe as a whole, as “all that exists”- how can you claim such thing? Again, this reeks of special pleading.
Defining god into existence? Alright.
It’s precisely more arbitrary, because unlike triangles, “god” has not been established to have such qualities, much less his existence. Also, lovely how just by doing this you assume your conclusion. It’s “impossible” for god to not exist, by your own claims.
When we say matter, we’re talking about its basic components- since matter and energy are essentially the same, they’re not contingent because
Anselm already? Except “greater” is an intentionally vague word used to obfuscate the issue. It might be “greater” for something to exist, according to the theists, or it actually might not. It’s even “greater” for something to create WITHOUT existing, since doing the same task without existing, which is the greatest obstacle, is greater. Also, existence isn’t a property
, but I’m sure you knew that.
Defining god into existence… yeah, called it.
Except the position that a “certain answer to a math problem being wrong can be conceived” can be falsified when it has been shown that that answer is true. God? All you have done is define god into existence.
Except the position that a “certain answer to a math problem being wrong can be conceived” can be falsified when it has been shown that that answer is true. God? All you have done is define god into existence.
Also, for something to be “maximally great” is again, vague and intentionally so. I’m assuming he’s referring to Platinga’s ontology argument, which makes a jump from possibly to actuality anyway.
How can you have a first and not ever have it not exist at the same time?
How can you have a “first” when it never NOT existed? In order for god to have “begun” and “caused” something, in order for there to be a “first”, it must necessarily have had a moment prior to which it did not exist, otherwise it never did not exist, which means it never began to exist.
Uh, yeah.
Which is the very self-defeating problem you’re facing. In order for there to BE a first, you need to have a prior moment in which it did not exist, otherwise it never did NOT exist, which leads to the very conclusion that is problematic for your case.
It’s absurd to say you can move from one end of infinity to the other, which is what he’s doing.
The analogy of passing a typewriter around assumes that there this only one such thing to be moved around. If typewriters could be copied by some process independent of the passing of same then the paradox would be resolved. Also, nice of you to keep assuming there MUST have been a beginning which hasn’t been established.
You mean like the mental gymnastics you’re performing here in regards to causality, which in fact requires time, which you’re TRYING to deny? Joe
A question,
I’m not here to argue. But I have a serious question: if all of these arguments were defeated, would you accept that God did not exist? Because it really does seem to me that Theists take advantage of our LACK of understanding by simply saying ‘God did it’. If I grant these arguments(which I most certainly do not), then couldn’t the universe be created by something other then a omnipotent being?
Also, another one:
You argue that God is not able to do what is logically impossible. You also argue that ‘out of nothing, nothing comes’. Wouldn’t that fall under the category of logically impossible? Justin
How do you know out of nothing, nothing comes? Nothing is the absence of ANYTHING, including logic. This means that because logic is absent in nothing (otherwise it would have properties and thus no longer be nothing), SOMETHING COULD COME. It is no longer a problem. Joe
Joe, you make it out like I’m arguing against you. Which is quite the opposite. But can you please stop being so aggressive? This is supposed to be a respectful blog. Justin
I do think that my original observation stands, unless Gil or Tim can tell me why it’s invalid. It seems to me that God is the entirety of the set of so-called ‘necessary’ entities. I posted above that I thought numbers could not be considered ‘necessary’, as they appear to me to be dependent upon rationality to have any meaning.
If I’m right, then ‘necessary’ is simply a synonym for ‘God’. So the argument would essentially be: the universe is either dependent or it is not dependent. If it is dependent, then its existence is explained by God.
Put this way, the argument obviously loses its strength.
To expand on my point that numbers are dependent upon rationality, I’ll put it this way: imagine one of these so-called ‘possible worlds’ existing, but there exists no rational mind to make sense of it. Without rationality, can we possibly talk of the quantities of anything on this world? It doesn’t seem to me that we can.
Of course, you may say that God is perfectly rational thus giving meaning to these numbers, but that presupposes his existence. We’re trying to prove that numbers are necessary independent from God, not that God can give them meaning. streetwaves
Actually, Justin, I was just making a side point
Joe
Justin, suppose all arguments for God’s existence failed – that doesn’t mean that God doesn’t exist. It just means that theists haven’t constructed a successful argument. Luckily that isn’t the case.
Now if the theist arguments failed AND there was a good argument against God’s existence there’d be an issue.
In regards to claim that these arguments are ones from ignorance, put simply, they aren’t. They aren’t saying we don’t know X (let X be “how the universe began” or “an explanation of contingent things”)therefore God exists. They are reasoning from generally accepted first premises to conclusions. They are deductively valid.
Streetwaves – okay, suppose that there is no God and yet you accept my argument about numbers necessarily exist in every possible world. You claim that numbers are dependent on the mind – I agree. This would seem to lead you to the conclusion that there are must be a necessary mind for these numbers to depend on, right?
And, to forestall a possible objection, it is possible for a necessary entities to be dependent on other necessary entities and not be contingent.
Numbers don’t have to independent of God for them not to be considered distinct from and not God. For example, classical theists hold that the world is dependent on God and he is the “ground of all being”. So let’s take a better example. The classical laws of logic. Those are necessary if anything is necessary in particular the Law of Non-Contradiction. Would you take the same stance in regards to ontology of the laws of logic? Note: just in case you do say the laws of logic are not necessary you are presupposing the necessity of the laws of logic to proclaim that!
But say you didn’t accept my argument about numbers (though it seems to me to be airtight). You mentioned that numbers aren’t necessary. That would make them contingent. Does it really make sense to say that numbers could possibly not be? That there really wouldn’t be 1 sun if minds were not around to understand that 1? That seems absurd.
And to add on a little to try to make my scattered points clearer: let’s take the converse of your original argument that God is really the set of all necessary entities.
I am contingent, my dog depends on me for it’s literal existence and it also contingent. We are both contingent. That doesn’t mean that just because my dog is dependent on me and I say I am contingent that I am the set of all contingent things. chris
The form of matter/space/energy taken, of which you are a particular arrangement, is “contingent”. I don’t care how many times Tim likes to try to define god into existence- hiding behind intentionally vague terms like “maximally great” or even “greatest” doesn’t help his case here. It doesn’t matter that you define god as the greatest possible, or a maximally great being, if there’s no evidence to support its actual existence. Joe
Chris, thanks for the reply.
Streetwaves – okay, suppose that there is no God and yet you accept my argument about numbers necessarily exist in every possible world.
If there is no God, I would not accept your argument that numbers necessarily exist in every possible world, unless you’re saying that some sort of other rational mind(s) exist on this world. But certainly, if we’re talking about “possible worlds”, there could be a world with no rational beings, and therefore no numbers. It seems to me that you will have a tough time proving that numbers “exist necessarily in every possible world” unless you presuppose the existence of God.
You claim that numbers are dependent on the mind – I agree. This would seem to lead you to the conclusion that there are must be a necessary mind for these numbers to depend on, right?
You’re presupposing that your statement is true; that numbers exist necessarily in every possible world. It isn’t right to make a statement A (numbers exist necessarily on every possible world), then say that in order for this true then statement B would have to be true (there must be a necessary mind for these numbers to depend on), so therefore A and B are both true.
And, to forestall a possible objection, it is possible for a necessary entities to be dependent on other necessary entities and not be contingent.
Numbers don’t have to independent of God for them not to be considered distinct from and not God. For example, classical theists hold that the world is dependent on God and he is the “ground of all being”. So let’s take a better example. The classical laws of logic. Those are necessary if anything is necessary in particular the Law of Non-Contradiction. Would you take the same stance in regards to ontology of the laws of logic? Note: just in case you do say the laws of logic are not necessary you are presupposing the necessity of the laws of logic to proclaim that!
I must admit, I do not understand how I am presupposing the necessity of the laws of logic to proclaim that they are not necessary. The objection is the same: logic is dependent upon rational beings/minds. I can’t imagine you would object to that. I do not have to presuppose the necessity of the laws of logic to state that they are not necessary. I’m not sure where you’re getting that.
But say you didn’t accept my argument about numbers (though it seems to me to be airtight). You mentioned that numbers aren’t necessary. That would make them contingent. Does it really make sense to say that numbers could possibly not be? That there really wouldn’t be 1 sun if minds were not around to understand that 1? That seems absurd.
Yes, numbers could possibly not be. You stated above that you agree that numbers are dependent upon the mind. If there is no mind, by that statement, you and I agree that they cannot exist. If there is no rationality, the statement “there is 1 sun” loses its meaning entirely. That one sun still exists of course, but then again I’m not saying that “stuff” does not exist.
I am contingent, my dog depends on me for it’s literal existence and it also contingent. We are both contingent. That doesn’t mean that just because my dog is dependent on me and I say I am contingent that I am the set of all contingent things.
You’re equivocating what I mean when I say ‘dependent’ (that numbers could not possibly exist without rationality) with your dog relying on you to feed it so that it will live a full and happy life. The two are not anywhere near the same. It’s your dog’s continued existence that depends on you, not the very possibility of its existence in the first place. streetwaves
Again, it seems to me that ‘necessary’ is simply a synonym for ‘God’. We’re simply defining this entity as rational, thus allowing numbers to exist, and then claiming numbers as another example of something which is necessary so that it’s not just God. I don’t follow. streetwaves
defining god into existence never really worked well. Joe
Streetwaves,
Necessity is simply a mode of existence/truth that says something cannot be otherwise. An example of this are the laws of logic because by its very nature it must be true or else you would be assuming its truth in order to deny it. Mathematics is just an extension of logic. Even if God is the “only” conceivable set of necessary entities, it would not seem to eliminate the fact that the universe needs an explanation. How would it follow from God being synonymous to necessity to the conclusion that the LCA looses its force?
Justin,
If God is a properly basic belief, then one arguably can be justified in believing God exists without evidence but I’m not for Plantinga’s epistemology at this moment. I would say that if all these arguments were defeated by answering the problems under a naturalistic framework (rather than simply showing the argument to be invalid) then I’d be convinced that God probably does not exist. Take the LCA as an example and suppose that the universe is necessary. The dilemma would effectively be answered which gives us no reason to posit an additional entity and more reason to think that metaphysical naturalism is true.
Yes.
Joe,
That’s exactly WHY we know that nothing could come from nothingness (hint: it is logically impossible). Gil S
in nothing, there is nothing, not even logic. It’s an absence of logic, and thus there is no logical impossibility.
Even conceding your conclusion, it doesn’t make any difference since it hasn’t been established anything really “began” to exist, no matter how much Tim likes to jump up and down and claim it does. In fact, the whole concept of a “timeless” beginning is nonsensical, never mind the sudden non-sequitur switch from “cause” to “causal” agent rooted in say Kalam. Joe
Necessity is simply a mode of existence/truth that says something cannot be otherwise. An example of this are the laws of logic because by its very nature it must be true or else you would be assuming its truth in order to deny it. Mathematics is just an extension of logic. Even if God is the “only” conceivable set of necessary entities, it would not seem to eliminate the fact that the universe needs an explanation. How would it follow from God being synonymous to necessity to the conclusion that the LCA looses its force?
Gil, denying the necessity of the laws logic isn’t the same as denying their existence now. I am simply stating that they are dependent on rationality.
Now, you seem to somewhat concede that God may indeed be the only member of the ‘set’ of necessary entities. The problem, then, is that the argument sounds like “the universe is either not God or it is God. If it is not God, then its existence is explained by God.” Does that sound like an argument with force?
The lack of force should be obvious. Remember, we’re trying to prove that God exists. If necessary is simply a synonym for God, we’re assuming his existence by saying that “the Universe must either be dependent or necessary (the Universe must either be dependent or God)”. streetwaves
@Street
Are you saying the arguments assume the conclusion and force a false dilemma? It does seem so. Joe
Yeah, I’m mostly talking about the Leibnizian argument, but it does seem that way to me. streetwaves
This might seem a bit unrelated to all of the arguments floating around here, but how could one formalize the two Thomistic Cosmological Arguments into syllogisms? Midas Vuik
I’d be convinced that God probably does not exist.
I will make this my life mission… Justin
Hmm… Quoteblock is not working for me… That was directed at Gil. Justin
Streetwaves,
Sorry for the wait.
The denial of logic’s necessity does not entail its nonexistence but to posit the possibility of it being false/nonexistent is to argue that contradictions can exist. How can something impossible be possible?
If that dilemma is sound and God is the only conceivable necessary being then logic inescapably leads us to the conclusion that God must exist. How would this beg the question? Unless you’re prepared to deny that only God can be necessary or that the universe can be God, then I cannot see how this argument would not succeed.
Joe,
It’s probably useful to recognize nothingness as an abstract conception of the mind, not as an actual logical possibility. For nothing to be what it is, we’d have to assume the law of identity to proceed with our conception. That is, we cannot say that something is equivalent to nothing because by definition they’re completely opposite terms. A lack of everything cannot produce something, let alone be something. You’d need logic in order to claim that it can. Which is what we have used in order to say that from nothing, nothing comes because that’s the only logical conclusion. Gil S
No problem Gil.
The denial of logic’s necessity does not entail its nonexistence but to posit the possibility of it being false/nonexistent is to argue that contradictions can exist. How can something impossible be possible?
I never said it would be false, only that it is dependent upon rationality. There is no contradiction there whatsoever. I think you need to explain this part a little bit better. There is no contradiction in saying that everything that is dependent upon rationality would not exist if there was no rationality. Logic, numbers, etc. all fall under that umbrella.
If that dilemma is sound and God is the only conceivable necessary being then logic inescapably leads us to the conclusion that God must exist. How would this beg the question? Unless you’re prepared to deny that only God can be necessary or that the universe can be God, then I cannot see how this argument would not succeed.
It absolutely does not lead to the conclusion that God must exist. As I said earlier, if God is the only necessary being, the argument is basically making the statement that God does before proving that he does. The logic can be sound and the premise can still be wrong. The premise that “either something is either dependent or it is God” is easily objected to because of the fact that it is simply assuming God’s existence as fact.
It has no more force than saying:
1. There is stuff made by God and there is God.
2. The Universe is stuff made by God.
3. There is God. streetwaves
Sorry about that bold at the end, guess I messed up my code. :S Everything after your second quote is mine. streetwaves
Streetwaves,
To be honest, it made your response look much more convincing
. Justin
I hope it wasn’t totally unconvincing without it
streetwaves
You denied its necessity though, which implies that it is possible for it to be false. What do you mean by rationality? By definition something is rational if it is logical. I’m guessing this is not what you mean since it would be akin to saying logic is dependent upon itself.
If the argument is sound then all the premises are true. Like I pointed out already, if God is conceivably the ONLY necessary being then this implies that the universe cannot be necessary but contingent. If it is contingent then it must be dependent upon God because He alone can be necessary. Follow this argument and God must exist. You might take this to be an example of begging the question but by granting that only God could be necessary, you can only have one explanation of all contingent reality and anything that is NOT God MUST be contingent because only He could be necessary. Gil S
You denied its necessity though, which implies that it is possible for it to be false. What do you mean by rationality? By definition something is rational if it is logical. I’m guessing this is not what you mean since it would be akin to saying logic is dependent upon itself.
Gil, logic is the science of reasoning. Certainly we can conceive of a world in which there are no rational beings – indeed, we often find it miraculous that we are here. So unless you’re wanting to go down the road of attempting to prove that a rock is capable of reasoning, objecting to my statement that logic is dependent upon rational minds and therefore could conceivably not exist is truly strange. And again, I never said that logic could be ‘false’ – it would be absurd to talk about the validity of something that is not there.
If the argument is sound then all the premises are true. Like I pointed out already, if God is conceivably the ONLY necessary being then this implies that the universe cannot be necessary but contingent. If it is contingent then it must be dependent upon God because He alone can be necessary. Follow this argument and God must exist. You might take this to be an example of begging the question but by granting that only God could be necessary, you can only have one explanation of all contingent reality and anything that is NOT God MUST be contingent because only He could be necessary.
The argument is not sound. I feel like you’re sort of avoiding my criticism, Gil. I’ll try to make it a little more clear:
Like I pointed out already, if God is conceivably the ONLY necessary being then this implies that the universe cannot be necessary but contingent.
What unfortunately this statement ignores is the fact that the first premise – either something is dependent or necessary – is completely unfounded if the only conceivable necessary being is God. Have you forgotten that the argument is trying to prove the existence of God? It’s assuming his existence right there! As I pointed out already, the argument sounds like this if God is the only conceivable ‘necessary’ entity:
1. There is stuff made by God and there is God.
2. The Universe is stuff made by God.
3. There is God.
Now, what you’re ignoring as well is that in order to classify God as necessary, we have to have a reason to think that necessary entities do exist. If the only example of a necessary entity you can think of is God, and that’s what we’re trying to prove, it follows that we have not only not proven God’s existence, but we haven’t proven that necessary entities exist. Therefore, the statement that either something is contingent or it is necessary is a leap of faith: how do we know that something is necessary if we can’t think of anything that is necessary without assuming what we’re trying to prove? It’s starting to sound merely like a First Cause argument.
In fact, you at first do recognize the problem with this, in that you tried to give a few examples of things that are necessary that do exist (numbers, logic). Unfortunately these aren’t necessary because they depend upon the existence of rational minds… in this case, us.
You might take this to be an example of begging the question but by granting that only God could be necessary, you can only have one explanation of all contingent reality and anything that is NOT God MUST be contingent because only He could be necessary.
Absolutely I do, because I’m not granting that God could be necessary. streetwaves
why not just say the arguments are assuming the conclusion here? Joe
I would say that, but I usually can’t resist responding to everything. streetwaves
hehe true enough. Joe